ORACLE

Security Research at Oracle Labs, Australia

Program Analysis Meets Security

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Research Director Oracle Labs, Brisbane, Australia 2021






We focus on automatically detecting security vulnerabilities and preventing security attacks by analysing programs.

Oracle Labs Australia

Established 2010





"To make intelligent application security, at scale, a reality"

Oracle Labs Australia vision

General Principles



Information and Software Security

- Security breaches aim to steal data: Other's data is valuable
- Cloud provider's responsibility to protect customer's data
 - Oracle has numerous cloud offerings



- Information needs protection
- Software security mechanisms protect information
- Assurance shows how can one rely on software for security

Exploit should not be the first security feedback





Remote code execution through .Net deserialization attack, June 2020





Remote code excedeserialization attack



Australian governmen routinely audited for d

The Accellion Data Breach Seems to Be Getting Bigger







Lucas Ropek

Published 3 months ago: February 12, 2021 at 9:40 am - Filed to: ACCELLION V



Photo: Dean Mouhtaropoulos, Getty Images

Data breach through SQL injection attack, February 2021



e than 70 per cent of state/territory governments' webpages and 57 nent webpages had at least one JavaScript library with publicly

alian government websites use code that's vulnerable to XSS



The Accellion Data Breac Bigger

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Published 3 months ago: February 12, 2021 at 9:40 am -



Photo: Dean Mouhtaropoulos, Getty Images

Data breach through SQL inju February 2021

routinely a The SolarWinds Cyber-Attack: What You Data Breac **Need to Know**

Last Updated: March 15, 2021

On December 13, 2020, FireEye announced the discovery of a highly sophisticated cyber intrusion that leveraged a on December 13, 2020, Firecye announced the discovery of a nignty sophisticated cyber intrusion that leveraged a commercial software application made by SolarWinds. It was determined that the advanced persistent threat (APT) are infiltrated the supply chain of ColarWinds, incorting a backdoor into the product. As supply chain of ColarWinds, incorting a backdoor into the product. commercial software application made by Solar Winds, it was determined that the advanced persistent direct (AFT) actors infiltrated the supply chain of Solar Winds, inserting a backdoor into the product. As customers downloaded the Traing Horse installation packages from Solar Winds attackers were able to access the systems supply that the Traing Horse installation packages from Solar Winds attackers were able to access the systems supply that the Traing Horse installation packages from Solar Winds attackers were able to access the systems. actors innitrated the supply chain or solarwings, inserting a packgoor into the product. As customers downloads the Trojan Horse installation packages from SolarWinds, attackers were able to access the systems running the

This cyber-attack is exceptionally complex and continues to evolve. The attackers randomized parts of their actions making traditional identification steps such as scanning for known indicators of compromise (IOC) of limited value.

**Affected organizations should proper for a complex and difficult remodiation from this attack.

Affected organizations should prepare for a complex and difficult remediation from this attack.

We have provided available IOCs as well as detailed a tiered set of guidance that organizations can take based on their consists compabilities and subgreggy its maturity. There is also a dedicated cortion with specific actions and subgreggy its maturity. we have provided available IOCs as well as decalled a dered sec of guidance that organizations can take based of their specific capabilities and cybersecurity maturity. There is also a dedicated section with specific actions and current for MS ISAC members and SLTT represents support for MS-ISAC members and SLTT governments.

.... cured) says people expect links to 1 overnment websites.

Supply chain attack introduces malware, March 2021

Oracle was not affected by this attack



The SolarWinds (Need to Know

Last Updated: March 15, 2021

Luc Pub

Photo: Dean

Executive Overview

On December 13, 2020, FireEye announced commercial software application made by actors infiltrated the supply chain of Solar the Trojan Horse installation packages fro SolarWinds product(s).

This cyber-attack is exceptionally comple making traditional identification steps su Affected organizations should prepare fo

We have provided available IOCs as well their specific capabilities and cybersecu support for MS-ISAC members and SLT

Supply cha

Accenture Confirms LockBit Ransomware Attack





UNTIL FILES

OD 13:00:42

PUBLICATION

11 Aug, 2021 17:30:00

Oracle was not affected by this attack


Oracle was not affected by this attack

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High-Level View



- Stop insecure flow
 - Network: Firewalls
 - Infrastructure: Scanners
 - ✓ Applications: Check have correct behaviour



Agenda

- Information vs software security
- Software development life cycle and vulnerability detection
- Program analysis techniques
- Strengths and open challenges



Information Security

- Information received and released have the right properties
- Integrity: Information received not malicious
 - Attacker may send malicious data but it is sanitised before use
- Confidentiality: Receiver authorised to view data
 - Data leaks violate confidentiality, needs declassification
- Non-repudiation: Neither sender nor receiver can deny their actions
- Other properties like Availability not considered here
- Need policies to specify permitted and forbidden information flows



Software Security

- Check that software does not have security vulnerabilities
 - Link software behaviour to information security
 - Detect potential security violations: E.g., OWASP Top 10
 - Information flow policies converted to program properties
- Example: Can confidential information leak via SQL injection?
 - Need to consider threat environment
 - What is exposed to the attacker and how can it be used
- Ideal: Mitigate all risks Defence in depth



Examples: Linking Information and Software Security

- Access control: Have right credentials
 - Authentication
 - Authorisation
- Boundary protection mechanisms
 - Firewalls
- Labelling information and protection domains
- Flow control
 - Encrypted tunnels



Policy and Configurations: Integrity

- Any user-controllable data is potentially malicious and hence tainted
 - Entry points; taint sources (can lead to integrity violations)
- Tainted data flows through the program via data flows in the application
 - Sanitisation/validation routines make tainted value untainted
- Security-sensitive statements are considered taint sinks
 - If a tainted value reaches a taint sink, a vulnerability is exposed

Policy and Configurations: Confidentiality

- Data that is security-sensitive should not reach an exit point unless that data is made available to the same security level
 - Sources: points where security sensitive values generated: identify credentials required for access
 - Sinks: points where information leaks (can lead to confidentiality violations)
 - Declassifiers: confidential information redacted



General Approach

Software Development Process, Operating Environment



Attack Surface

The attack surface of a software environment is the sum of the different points (the "attack vectors") where an unauthorized user (the "attacker") can try to enter data to or extract data from an environment.

OWASP



Attack Surface: Inputs and Resources

- User interface (UI) forms and fields
- HTTP headers and cookies
- APIs
- Files
- Databases and other local storage
- Email or other kinds of messages
- Run-time arguments provided by user



Attack Surface: Mapped to Code

- Login/authentication entry points
- Admin interfaces
- Inquiries and search functions
- Data entry (CRUD) forms
- Business workflows
- Transactional interfaces/APIs
- Operational command and monitoring interfaces/APIs
- Interfaces with other applications/systems



Application Security Testing (AST) Definitions: Gartner

SAST

- Static testing tools analyse the code (source code, bytecode, or binary code) for security vulnerabilities
- May or may not compile the code
- White-box testing

IAST

- Interactive testing tools combine elements of SAST and DAST simultaneously
- Typically implemented as an agent within the test runtime environment
- Uses test cases
- Can test whether known vulnerabilities are actually exploitable in the running app

DAST

- Dynamic testing tools run at runtime, while the application is running
- It simulates attacks against an application, analyses the app's reactions, and determines whether it's vulnerable
- Black-box testing



Application Security Testing (AST) Definitions: Gartner

SCA

- Software composition analysis
- Examines software to determine origin of components and libraries
- Aim is to identify vulnerabilities in commonly used components (not in inhouse developed components)

RASP


- Runtime application selfprotection
- Blocks computer attacks through runtime instrumentation
- Monitors inputs and reports (monitor mode) or blocks (protection mode) attacks


ASTO


- Application Security Testing Orchestration
- Central management and reporting of all the different AST tools running in an ecosystem




Building Security Checking Into the Lifecycle








The Application Security Testing Suite



Detecting Vulnerabilities in Web Applications



Strategies

- Development
 - Unit testing, CI/CD, Static Analysis
- Complete System
 - End-to-end testing, Dynamic Analysis
- Trial deployment
 - Test with different configurations, *Dynamic Analysis*



Specific Projects



Projects

- Static Analysis
 - Source code
- Dynamic Analysis
 - Client-side
 - Server-side
- Other Approaches
 - Malware Detection including Machine Learning
 - Synthesis for RASP
 - SCA




Parfait: Static Analysis

- Key Features
 - High precision: 90% true positives
 - Scalable: 10 mins per MLOC on a 2.6 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2690
- Vulnerabilities that matter
 - SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), LDAP injection, OS injection
 - XXE/XEE
 - Using weak crypto
 - Insecure deserialization
 - Buffer overflows
 - Dereference of untrusted pointer
 - Trusted boundary vulnerabilities



Parfait Architecture






Affogato: Analysis at Testing Time

- Instrumentation-based dynamic analysis tool for Node.js
- Tunable precision through configuration, with optional post-processing
- Overhead amortises over time for long runs, high for short-running tests
- Vulnerabilities that can be detected
 - SQL injection
 - Cross-site scripting
 - Path traversal
 - Unvalidated redirects and forwards
 - Command injection
 - Information leak

AFFOGATO: runtime detection of injection attacks for Node.js (Workshop at ISSTA/ECOOP 2018)



Affogato Architecture






Gelato: Analysis at Deployment Time

- Dynamic analysis tool for web applications
 - Treats server as black-box
 - Analyses client-side JavaScript code
 - Detects end-points on the server with high precision
- Vulnerabilities that can be detected
 - DOM-XSS on the client
 - Reflected XSS on the server
 - Information leak: Session tokens in URL parameters

Gelato: Feedback-driven and Guided Security Analysis of Client-side Web Applications



Gelato Architecture



Strengths

Parfait

- ✓ Has very low FPs: Identifies actionable items
- ✓ Can handle incomplete code

Affogato

- ✓ Works on running instance with test cases
- ✓ Acceptable overhead of instrumentation acceptable

Gelato

- ✓ Works on running instance
- ✓ No test cases required



Challenges

- Parfait
 - ? Support for frameworks: Code not invoked directly
 - ? Use of reflection makes static analysis hard
- Affogato
 - ? Instrument diverse systems without affecting semantics
 - ? What does semantics preservation mean in general?
- Gelato
 - ? Is Gelato making progress or just stuck?
 - ? How to reach a state to start a new exploration?



Other Projects

- Malware detection: Go beyond syntactic patterns
 - Abstract Interpretation based analysis of JavaScript in PDF
 - ML techniques for Office documents
- Synthesis
 - Generate program-point specific allowlists
 - Blocklists can be evaded
- Software Composition Analysis (SCA)
 - Nascent stage: Uses and enhances our existing techniques




- Based on the SAFE abstract interpretation framework (SAFE-PDF).
- 9,410 malicious, 14,306 benign PDFs.
- On average, < 4 sec. per document.

	Tool	FP Ratio	Recall	Accuracy
ML	Slayer	2.99%	99.23%	97.89%
ML	Hidost	1.53%	99.67%	98.95%
Abs. Int.	SAFE-PDF	2.70%	99.93%	98.34%

Sources:

https://github.com/sukyoung/safe


https://jis-eurasipjournals.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13635-016-0045-0



Learning-Based Detection of Malicious Office Documents

- 11,551 malicious email attachments
- 32,450 benign documents
- On average < 1 sec. per document


Model	Precision	Recall	Accuracy
Ensemble	96.94%	98.00%	97.45%






Data-Driven Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP)


Automatically synthesizing and enforcing protections







SCA Analysis: Overview



Maven Repository: Centralized location that stores all the open source Java libraries

NVD: National Vulnerability Database

CVE: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. It's a list of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and exposures




Intelligent Application Security At Scale

- Characteristics of real systems
 - Large: Multi-million lines of code, Uses many 3rd party libraries
 - Use different technologies
- Security game
 - Attacker has to find one exploit
 - Defenders have to protect against all possible attacks
- Different tools generate different signals
 - Automated handling of these signals
 - Examples: Integrate in CI/CD, Process logs from monitoring



Example of Combined Dynamic Analysis

- Send or generate inputs
- 2. Gather and use taint feedback
- 3. Generate taint and **exploit** reports






Intelligent Application Security At Scale

- Need to integrate security signals from different sources
 - Parfait and Affogato: Static and dynamic traces
 - Parfait and Gelato: Gelato finds taint sources to configure Parfait
 - SCA and Affogato: Vulnerable component used at runtime
- Relies of feedback from different phases of the life-cycle
 - DevSecOps: Code, build, test, deploy, operate, monitor
 - Security underpins all these activities



DevSecOps

Parfait, SCA





Intelligent Application Security At Scale

- Intelligent Coding: Support for developers
 - Prevent security vulnerabilities from being introduced
- Intelligent Security Testing: Support for testers
 - Check for potential violations of policies
- Intelligent Security Monitoring: Deployment, Operations
 - Prevent attacks at runtime



General Research Questions

- What are the security issues that matter?
- Can we prevent 0-day attacks?
- How can one leverage different analysis concepts to detect the security issues?
- What are the tradeoffs when handling industrial scale systems?
- How to handle different technologies used in a single complex application?



Conclusion

- Application Security vast field
- Different techniques needed to defend against potential attackers
- Parfait, Gelato, Affogato and other tools examples of different techniques
 - Useful at different phases in the DevSecOps cycle
- These tools need to work together
- Numerous research and engineering challenges remain
- Looking for collaborators
 - Have various types of internships
 - Mix of research and engineering tasks
 - Duration: E.g., 3-6 months full time, part-time




Thank You

Questions?

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Our mission is to help people see data in new ways, discover insights, unlock endless possibilities.

