



Are We Ready For Secure Languages?





Cristina Cifuentes
Chief Galah
Oracle Labs Australia
July 2016

HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:



<https://xkcd.com/1354/>



HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:



Buffer errors




<https://xkcd.com/1354/>



<https://xkcd.com/327/>




<https://xkcd.com/327/>



IF SOMEONE STEALS MY LAPTOP WHILE I'M
LOGGED IN, THEY CAN READ MY EMAIL, TAKE MY
MONEY, AND IMPERSONATE ME TO MY FRIENDS,
BUT AT LEAST THEY CAN'T INSTALL
DRIVERS WITHOUT MY PERMISSION.

<https://www.xkcd.com/1200/>



IF SOMEONE STEALS MY LAPTOP WHILE I'M LOGGED IN, THEY CAN READ MY EMAIL, TAKE MY MONEY, AND IMPERSONATE ME TO MY FRIENDS, BUT AT LEAST THEY CAN'T INSTALL DRIVERS WITHOUT MY PERMISSION.

Access Control

<https://www.xkcd.com/1200/>



C, C++

Java
Java <-> C

Java EE
Java <-> C, Java <-> PL/SQL
JavaScript

2477

Vulnerabilities due to **buffer errors**
(2013-2015)

National Vulnerability Database, <http://nvd.nist.gov>

2230

Vulnerabilities due to **cross-site scripting** (2013-2015)

National Vulnerability Database, <http://nvd.nist.gov>

1793

Vulnerabilities due to **permissions, privileges and access control**
(2013-2015)

National Vulnerability Database, <http://nvd.nist.gov>

1972

Buffer overflow used in a kernel [1]

1988

Buffer overflow used in the Morris worm

1990s

Cross-site scripting exploits


1998

SQL injection explained in the literature [2]

[1] Computer Security Technology Planning Study, 1972. [2] Phrack Magazine, 8(54), article 8

How is this possible?


Reported Vulnerabilities per Year






National Vulnerability Database, <http://nvd.nist.gov>


TIOBE Programming Community Index

Source: www.tiobe.com



June 2016





<http://xkcd.com/932/>

```
class Launcher {  
  
    public static void main(  
        String[] args)  
    {  
        int numArgs = args.length;  
        Argument[] validArgs =  
            new Argument[numArgs]  
  
        for (int i = 0; i < numArgs; ++i) {  
            String arg = args[i];  
  
            // debug  
            System.out.println("argument " + i +  
                " = " + arg);  
  
            try {  
                validArgs[i] = ARGUMENT_FACTORY.create(arg);  
            } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {  
                System.out.println("Invalid argument: " + arg);  
                System.exit(1);  
            }  
        }  
        processArgs(validArgs);  
    }  
}
```

Attackers look at code from the point of view of how to **break** into it

Developers write code from the point of view of **functionality** required

Sample Attacker Techniques

- **Buffer Errors**
 - Return to stack
 - RoP
 - Heap spray
 - Return to libc
 - ...

Sample Attacker Techniques

- **Buffer Errors**

- Return to stack
- RoP
- Heap spray
- Return to libc
- ...

- **Injections**

- Missing validation altogether or validating SQL as HTML
- Edge cases (e.g., partial sanitisation of HTML entities)
- Use of blacklists rather than whitelists
- ...

Sample Attacker Techniques

- **Buffer Errors**


- Return to stack
- RoP
- Heap spray
- Return to libc
- ...

- **Injections**


- Missing validation altogether or validating SQL as HTML
- Edge cases (e.g., partial sanitisation of HTML entities)
- Use of blacklists rather than whitelists
- ...

- **Access Control**


- Missing checks
- Incorrect checks (e.g., check for “logged in user” and not “logged in administrator”)



Why Is This Happening?



Buffer Errors Injections Access Control



Need Sanitisation



Sanitisation is the developer's responsibility

Most languages do not provide sanitisation support

Solution: Education

- Many PL subjects don't cover security aspects per se
- Few universities offer PL Security courses at undergraduate level
- Companies do own training

Solution: Education

Not Working

- Many PL subjects don't cover security aspects per se
- Few universities offer PL Security courses at undergraduate level

Solution: Static Analysis Tools

- Re-parse the code with different compiler
- Encode semantics of PL in intermediate representation (IR)
- Analyse IR with over or under approximations
- Report bugs/vulnerabilities with False Positives (over) or False Negatives (under)

Solution: Static Analysis Tools

- Re-parse the code with different compiler
- Encode semantics of PL in intermediate representation (IR)
- Analyse IR with over or under approximations
- Report bugs/vulnerabilities with False Positives (over) or False Negatives (under)

Incomplete

Solutions: Dynamic and Verification Tools

Dynamic

- Dynamic analysis tools
 - Instrumentation
 - Introspection
- Fuzzing

Verification

- Model checking
- Theorem proving

Solutions

Dynamic

- Dynamic analysis tools
 - Instrumentation
 - Introspection
- Fuzzing

Incomplete

Verification

- Model checking
- Theorem proving

Doesn't scale

We can design languages that avoid some of these issues statically



Avoid Buffer Errors Statically

RUST

- Guaranteed memory safety
 - Ownership
 - Borrowing
 - shared borrow (&T)
 - mutable borrow (&mut T)
- Efficiency
 - Zero-cost abstractions
 - Parallelisation

Graydon Hoare, 2009

We can design languages or extensions that track some of these issues dynamically

Avoid Buffer Errors Statically and Dynamically

The logo for 'Checked C' features the word 'Checked' in a large, blue, sans-serif font with a subtle drop shadow, positioned above a smaller, blue, sans-serif letter 'C'. Both elements are centered on a light gray rectangular background.

- Extends C with bounds checking
 - 3 new checked pointer types: `ptr`, `array_ptr`, `span`
 - Bounds-checked arrays: `checked`
 - Checked member bounds
 - Bounds-safe interfaces
 - Checked program scopes
 - Lightweight invariants
 - Runtime errors on pointer arithmetic overflow and null pointer for `array_ptr`
- Dynamic checks

David Tarditi, June 2016 (v 0.5)

Avoid Buffer Errors Dynamically



LISP

John McCarthy, 1958

- Managed memory
 - Garbage collection
 - First introduced in LISP in 1958
- Now in
 - OO languages: Smalltalk, Java, C#, JavaScript, Go
 - Functional languages: ML, Haskell, APL
 - Dynamic languages: Ruby, Perl, PHP

Avoid Injections Dynamically



Larry Wall, 1987

- Taint mode
 - Perl 3, 1989
 - Automatic checks when program running with different real and effective user or group IDs
 - -T flag to turn it on
- Similar ideas in
 - Ruby

We have made first steps to provide developers with access control support in the language

First Steps at Avoiding Access Control Issues

The word "JAVA" in large, bold, blue, sans-serif capital letters with a slight drop shadow, centered on a light gray background.

James Gosling, 1991

- Safely run untrusted applets on your computer
- Security model
 - Java 1.2, 1998 [Li Gong]
 - Subscribes to the principle of least privilege
 - Security Manager mediates all access control decisions
 - Stack-based checks
- Similar ideas in
 - .NET framework

Avoid Access Control Issues



CAJJA

Mark Miller, ~2010

- Extends/limits JavaScript to safely embed untrusted active content inside your web browser
 - Available as a plugin, ~2011
- Object-oriented capabilities
 - A capability-secure JS subset (SES – Secure ECMAScript)
 - A safe DOM wrapper (Domado)
 - A HTML and CSS sanitiser

Memory safe

Rust,
Checked C,
JS, Go, Ruby

Perl

Injection free

Java,
Caja



Access control

performance



static

Rust

Your language?

static & dynamic

Checked C

Your language?

dynamic


JavaScript
Go
Ruby
Perl
Java
Caja

Your language?



safety

Intermezzo



<http://xkcd.com/538/>

```
int getRandomNumber()  
{  
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.  
             // guaranteed to be random.  
}
```

<http://xkcd.com/221/>

1769

Vulnerabilities due to **cryptographic issues** (2013-2015)

National Vulnerability Database, <http://nvd.nist.gov>

Cryptographic Issues

- Use of hardcoded passwords
- Use of deprecated algorithms
- Use of wrong defaults
- Use of hardcoded seeds
- Improperly hashed passwords
- Deterministic seeds to generate random numbers
- Valid users and host security keys left on an image of a cloud platform
- ...

Sample Attacker Techniques

- Poor API design (e.g., weak defaults)
- Weaknesses in protocols
- Use of deprecated suites
- “Breakthroughs”

We have made first steps at providing a Cryptographic API for non-crypto developers to use

First Steps to Avoid Cryptographic Issues

The word "JAVA" is written in large, bold, blue, sans-serif capital letters with a slight drop shadow, centered on a light gray rectangular background.

James Gosling, 1991

- Cryptography Architecture
 - Java 1.1, 1997
 - Framework for cryptography
 - APIs for encryption, key generation & management, secure random number generation, certificate validation, ...
- Similar ideas in
 - .NET framework
 - PyCrypto
 - krypt for Ruby
 - crypto for Go, ...


Crypto APIs are too low level

FIGURING OUT WHY MY HOME
SERVER KEEPS RUNNING OUT
OF SWAP SPACE AND CRASHING:



1-10 HOURS

PLUGGING IT INTO A LIGHT TIMER
SO IT REBOOTS EVERY 24 HOURS:



5 MINUTES

WHY EVERYTHING I HAVE IS BROKEN


894

Vulnerabilities due to **resource management** issues (2013-2015)


Resource Management Issues

- Use after free
- Double free
- Memory corruption
- Type casting error
- Worker termination error

Resource Management Issues



Resource Management Issues



Few solutions to resource management
issues are available

Memory Safe languages avoid use-after-free
and double-free issues




<http://xkcd.com/580/>

149

Vulnerabilities due to **race conditions**
(2013-2015)

We need to consider the future concurrent world and make race conditions a thing of the past

Concurrency by Default



GO

- Goroutines for concurrency
 - CSP-style, light-weight process
 - goroutines communicate and synchronise using channels
- Main goals
 - simplicity, safety and readability
- Not data-race free

Robert Griesemer, Rob Pike and Ken Thompson, 2007

Avoid Race Conditions



PONY

Sylvan Clebsch, Sebastian Blessing, Sophia Drossopoulou, ~2014

- Actors for concurrency
 - Fast: zero-copy messaging
 - Safe: **data-race free type system**
- Reference capabilities/Type qualifiers based on deny properties
 - iso, trn, ref, val, box, tag
attached to the path to an object
 - mutable, immutable, opaque



Avoid Race Conditions

Clojure

Rick Hickey, ~2005

- Concurrency via immutable data structures
 - Identities: a series of immutable states over time
- and mutable reference types
- Designed for simplicity and data orientation

Cryptography support

Java, .NET,
Python,
Ruby

Rust

Resource management support



Go

Pony,
Clojure

Data-race free

Library
(crypto)

Java
.NET
Python
Ruby
Go

Your
language?

In the
language

Go
Rust
Pony
Clojure

Your
language?



safety




What is Security in the Context of Programming Languages?



safety in
library



safety in
the
language




14844

Vulnerabilities in the past 3 years
(2013-2015)

TIOBE Programming Community Index

Source: www.tiobe.com



June 2016

Education lagging

It's time to include security in our language design

There Will be Barriers for New Adoption

- Performance
- Usability
- Removing cognitive overload
- Legacy language support / interoperability / FFI

Challenge – To design languages that provide security and eradicate buffer errors, injections, access control issues, cryptography issues, resource management issues and race conditions

Challenge – To provide the context for tainted data that crosses along different layers

Challenge – To provide high-level crypto APIs (e.g., stores password, does hashing) that don't require changes over time?

Challenge – To provide security guarantees
in the languages we design

18.5

million software developers
worldwide (11M professional,
7.5M hobbyist)

<http://www.idc.com/research/viewtoc.jsp?containerId=244709>, IDC December 2013 report

Security is not just for expert developers

We need security for the masses

crisrina.cifuentes@oracle.com

<http://labs.oracle.com/locations/australia>

Integrated Cloud

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ORACLE®